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Post-Fordist economies come along with post-welfarist societies marked by intensified cultural individualism and increased structural inequalities. These 
conditions are commonly held to be conducive to relative deprivation and, thereby, anomic crime. At the same time, post-welfarist societies develop a new 
“balance of power” between institutions providing for welfare regulation, such as the family, the state and the (labour) market—and also the penal system. 
These institutions are generally expected to improve social integration, ensure conformity and thus reduce anomic crime.
Combining both perspectives, we analyse the effects of moral individualism, social inequality, and different integration strategies on crime rates in 
contemporary societies through the lenses of anomie theory. To test our hypotheses, we draw on time-series cross-section data compiled from different 
data sources (OECD, UN, WHO, WDI) for twenty developed countries in the period 1970–2004, and run multiple regressions that control for country-specific 
effects.
Although we find some evidence that the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the 
anomic pressure, whereas conservative (family-based), social-democratic (state-based) and liberal (market-based) integration strategies to a certain 
extent prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime, the results are not very robust. Moreover, reservations have to be made regarding the effects 
of “market” income inequality as well as familialist, unionist and liberalist employment policies that are shown to have reversed effects in our sample: the 
former reducing, the latter occasionally increasing anomic crime.
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1. Introduction
The anomie concept originating in the classic works of 
Durkheim (1984 [1893], 1952 [1897]) and Merton (1938, 1968 
[1949]) has inspired large strands of criminology on both 
sides of the Atlantic (Rock 2002; Deflem 2006). But anomie 
is not confined to the sociology of crime; it also figures 
prominently in sociology as such: As a somewhat fuzzy, 
“complex” and “multidimensional” concept (Sztompka 
1998), it provides heuristic guidance for sociological theory-
building at the interface of normative and factual orders 
(nomos) and orients macrosociological research towards 
problems of integration and regulation. The causes and 
functions of deviance and delinquency are thus not only 
found in society at large; societies themselves are made up 
by “nomic” as well as “anomic” processes (Marks 1974).
Focussing on anomic crime in post-welfarist societies, 
this paper aims to contribute both to general and criminal 
sociology: By analysing the interplay of culture and struc-
ture and the interaction of major institutions (state, market, 
family) in “ordering”, “dis-ordering” and “re-ordering” 
society, we provide a macrocontextualization of individual 
delinquency through the prism of anomie theory.
In our theoretical approach, we combine classic elements 
of both the Durkheimian and the Mertonian tradition and 
also benefit from recent developments in “institutional-ano-
mie theory” (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994, 2006; Rosenfeld 
2006). The latter parallels our own efforts in linking up to 
comparative research on the social foundations of welfare 
capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). By including 
insights from this field of study, we hope to shed new light 
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on the tensions between individualization and integration 
in contemporary societies (Thome 2007).
Empirically, we build on research in the fields of “inequal-
ity and crime” and “institutions and crime”. We develop a 
model that combines conceptual and statistical features of 
state-of-the-art studies in both areas but adopts an original 
set of hypotheses based on our theoretical approach. Draw-
ing on time-series cross-section data for twenty developed 
countries, we run multiple regressions that allow us to 
describe crime-generating mechanisms within and across 
welfarist and increasingly “post-welfarist” societies net of 
country-specific effects (Dean 1999).
2. Theoretical Background
In the following, we will briefly describe the different 
components of our theoretical approach and the anomie 
concept underlying our empirical study.
The first component of our approach figuratively goes back 
to Merton standing on the shoulders of Durkheim (Merton 
1965), and basically refers to a mismatch between culture 
and structure at the macrosocial level that generates anomic 
pressure at the microsocial level: individuals who do not 
have the (structurally given) opportunities to live up to the 
(culturally prescribed) goals might thus turn to criminal ca-
reers. This rather rudimentary reading of the classic anomie 
concept can be enriched by Durkheim’s focus on cultural 
inclusion, namely the “cult of the individual” (1973a [1898], 
1961 [1952]), and Merton’s focus on structural exclusion, 
experienced as “relative deprivation” (1968 [1949]; Merton 
and Kitt 1950). With respect to these notions, we would 
argue that the “inclusive” ideal of individual achievement 
also generates the “exclusive” reality of individual under-
achievement. The anomic conflict between an individualis-
tic culture of competition and success on the one hand and 
stratified and precarious opportunities to compete and suc-
ceed on the other hand would thus be inherent in capitalist 
societies and generate a “normal” level of crime.
The second component of our anomie concept adds “social 
institutions” to this picture, as suggested by institutional-
anomie theory. Whereas institutions have been in the 
centre of sociological interest from the very beginning 
(Durkheim 1966 [1895]), criminology still stands to gain 
from institutional analysis: Starting from this assessment, 
Messner and Rosenfeld commit themselves to “explaining 
different levels and forms of crime with reference to three 
analytically distinct types of institutional configurations 
that reflect differences in the articulation of institutions, or 
differences in the ‘institutional balance of power’” (2004, 
96). The three ideal-typical institutional configurations they 
refer to are inspired by Esping-Andersen’s original “three 
worlds of welfare capitalism” (1990) and his later emphasis 
on the “inter-causal triad of state, market and family” (1999, 
35). Using the same references, we will distinguish between 
three strategies of social integration that capture the differ-
ent emphasis welfare regimes put on the role of the state, the 
labour market, and the family. In this perspective, anomic 
crime results from institutional failure.
The third component complements our approach and 
integrates the aforementioned aspects. Assuming that the 
crime-generating mechanisms suggested by our “classic” 
and “institutionalist” readings of the anomie concept point 
to different, albeit related dimensions of the problem at 
hand, we combine them in a larger framework. The first 
dimension, namely the conflict between cultural inclusion 
(promising individual achievement) and structural exclu-
sion (perpetuating individual underachievement), thus 
interacts with the second dimension, namely the interplay 
and respective performance of major institutions (state, 
market, family) in providing welfare regulation and social 
integration. In this sense, crime is a result of both indi-
vidual failure “to conform” and institutional failure “to 
integrate”.
1 Countries included in the sample are Austria, 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
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This twofold understanding of anomie is embedded in a 
larger framework of macrosociological theories that deal 
with societal transformations in the age of “globalization” 
and account for cross-national convergence and divergence 
at the same time. In this context, we would assign the cult 
of the individual and its neoliberal excesses to the level of 
world culture. The presumptions—and impositions—of 
rational actorhood and self-government are thus seen as 
factors of global convergence (Meyer and Jepperson 2000; 
Foucault 2007, 2008). In contrast, patterns of social integra-
tion are generally attributed to the national level, where 
strong institutional complementarities and path-depen-
dencies seem to preserve distinct regulatory cultures and 
varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001; Streeck and 
Thelen 2005).
By integrating the tension between global convergence 
(with respect to cultural values) and national divergence 
(with respect to institutional realities) into our model, we 
strive for a better understanding of the globalized division 
of labour and its characteristic problem of order. In other 
words, we expect that post-Fordist economies come along 
with post-welfarist societies that can be described by a new 
cult of the individual and shifting patterns of integration 
as well as by typical (individual and institutional) failures 
generating anomic crime. Sociological theory and crimi-
nological research would thus once more benefit from each 
other (Garland and Sparks 2000).
3. Previous Research
In our theoretical model, we highlighted two mechanisms 
that offer complementary explanations for anomic crime. 
The first mechanism attributes individual delinquency to 
structural inequality in highly competitive societies, the 
second builds on the integration capacity of specific institu-
tional configurations at the national level. Although we are 
not aware of empirical studies that are fully compatible with 
our approach, comparative research based on international 
crime statistics has recently clustered around problems of 
“inequality and crime” as well as “institutions and crime”. 
In the following, we will briefly sketch out some of the con-
nections these studies have to our project and summarize 
the most relevant results.
Although comparative research on the criminogenic effects 
of inequality rarely starts from the “division of labour in 
society”, we will commence our short review once more 
with Durkheim (1984 [1893]), or rather with Messner’s 
“cross-national test of a Durkheimian model”. In this early 
study, Messner accounts for both “moral individualism” 
and “social inequality” and thus employs concepts that are 
largely consistent with the first component of our anomie 
concept, namely the cult of the individual on the one hand 
and the stratified opportunity structure on the other hand 
(1982, 229; 1989, 607). While the latter—social inequality—
is measured by the Gini coefficient, the former—moral 
individualism—is operationalized by the school enrolment 
ratio (or, alternatively, the size of the Protestant population).
With this conceptual reminder, we will now turn to the 
state-of-the-art in comparative research on inequality and 
crime. Our main point of reference is a rather comprehen-
sive and statistically sophisticated study by Fajnzylber, Led-
erman, and Loayza (2002). Their model is based on panel 
data (robberies: 37 countries, 1970–94; homicides: 39 coun-
tries, 1965–95) and accounts for country-specific effects. Net 
of controls (GDP growth, GNP per capita, urbanization and 
educational attainment), it establishes a positive causal link 
between income inequality, measured by Gini coefficient 
or P80/P20 ratio, and violent crime, namely robberies and 
homicides. Educational attainment (i.e. average years of 
education in the adult population) yields negative results 
with respect to homicides but positive results with respect 
to robberies (ibid., 18).
The main findings of the study—a robust positive link be-
tween inequality and crime—are questioned by Neumayer 
(2003; 2005). Like Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002), 
he accounts for country-specific effects but uses different 
samples (robberies: up to 59 countries, 1980–97; homicides: 
up to 117 countries, 1980–97), adds and varies explanatory 
and control variables (e.g. including social welfare expen-
ditures, female labour force participation, percentage of 
male population aged 15–64; unemployment rate) and omits 
educational attainment for reasons of data availability and 
the inconsistency of previous results (2005, 105, fn. 1). While 
Neumayer substantiates his critique for bigger samples of 
countries that show no evidence for a causal link between 
inequality and crime, he also replicates the crime-inducing 
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effects of Gini coefficient and P80/P20 ratio in smaller 
samples (robberies: 33 and 30 countries respectively) that 
are comparable to those in the aforementioned study.
Research in the field of crime and institutions that concerns 
the second component of our approach largely centres 
around adherents and critics of institutional-anomie theory 
(Rosenfeld 2006). Comparative studies that try to “expand 
and maximize variation in institutional structure” (Mess-
ner and Rosenfeld 2004, 98) have been undertaken on the 
national level, preferably scrutinizing the anomic potential 
of the “American Dream” in its homeland (Messner and 
Rosenfeld 1994), as well as on the international level. While 
our project is mostly interested in the latter, research on 
crime in the United States also offers some conceptual 
advice.
Studies at the U.S. level specify the dependent variable 
either as property crime or violent crime (both includ-
ing robberies) or instrumental and expressive homicides 
(Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Piquero and Leeper Piquero 
1998; Maume and Lee 2003; Baumer and Gustafson 2007). 
Independent variables generally include income inequality 
(Gini coefficient or poverty rate) as a proxy for “economic 
dominance” in the institutional balance of power, and mea-
sures of the institutional strength of “non-economic” social 
spheres like the education system (e.g. school enrolment 
ratio), the polity (e.g. welfare expenditures), and the family 
(e.g. divorce rate). While income inequality is expected to 
increase delinquency, the education system is credited with 
a crime-reducing effect (Piquero and Leeper Piquero 1998, 
69). The latter assumption stands in remarkable contrast to 
earlier accounts of the disintegrative potential of moral in-
dividualization through education (Messner 1982). Baumer 
and Gustafson (2007, 634–5) instead construct indices of 
“low educational and economic attainment” and “educa-
tional and income inequality” that are both expected to 
exert positive effects on crime.
Comparative research at the cross-national level is more 
restricted with respect to data availability and quality. 
Accordingly, the authors of the studies reviewed here 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000; Pratt and 
Godsey 2003) take recourse to the homicide rate as depen-
dent variable and proxy for anomic crime. However, this is 
debatable: As mentioned above, homicides and robberies 
(or property crime more generally) do not always generate 
consistent results (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Jensen 2002; 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002). As regards “insti-
tutional” variables, mainly income inequality (“economic 
dominance”) and decommodification measures (“political 
restraint”) are included, the latter inspired by Esping-An-
dersen (1990). Both are expected to exert independent and 
opposite effects on homicides (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997, 
1402; Savolainen 2000, 1026). Control variables comprise 
several demographic and development indicators (e.g. sex 
ratio, GNP growth, urbanization). Despite their theoretical 
relevance, the institutional effects of education and fam-
ily are not singled out but more or less subordinated to the 
political dimension (Savolainen 2000, 1023). In addition to 
these shortcomings, reservations have to be made regarding 
the estimation methods, in this case OLS or WLS regres-
sions on the basis of relatively small samples  
(n = 39, 45 or 46) without controls for country-specific ef-
fects. Nevertheless, the results of the reported studies are in 
line with assumptions derived from institutional-anomie 
theory, namely a negative, i.e. crime-reducing, effect of 
decommodification (all three studies), a positive effect of 
inequality, and a negative interaction effect between income 
inequality and decommodification (Savolainen 2000; Pratt 
and Godsey 2003).
We will conclude this section with another desideratum 
of the “institutionalist” approach: Although the compila-
tion referred to above (Rosenfeld 2006) includes an article 
on relations between welfare institutions and imprison-
ment (Sutton 2004), and in spite of ongoing discussions on 
a shift from “penal-welfare policies” of social support to 
post-welfarist strategies of “governmental control” (Garland 
2000; Rose 2000), the penal system is not considered as a 
social institution, let alone as a “labour market institution”, 
as recently argued for the U.S. (Western and Beckett 1999; 
Western 2006; Münch 2007). Still, rising imprisonment 
rates are not only observed in liberal countries deemed 
“exceptional” in this respect but, for instance, also in Scan-
dinavia (Lappi-Seppälä 2007). It thus seems appropriate to 
conceive of the “new punitiveness” as one of the strategies of 
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social integration in the repertoire of post-welfarist regimes 
(Pratt et al. 2005; Durkheim 1973b [1900]).
4. Rationale and Hypotheses
The focus of our research is the transformation of integra-
tion patterns in contemporary societies under the condi-
tion of intensified individualism and increased inequality. 
Through the lenses of anomie theory, the incidence of 
crime in a society indicates the effectiveness of institutions, 
or institutional configurations, in “integrating” individu-
als otherwise prone to delinquency, namely for reasons of 
relative deprivation. Comparative political economy has 
specified strategies of integration, or regulation, prevailing 
in certain types of welfare regimes but has also pointed out 
the widespread mix of these strategies and recent tenden-
cies of convergence (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Powell and 
Barrientos 2004).
In order to map integration patterns at work in societies 
at the transition from welfarism to post-welfarism, we will 
therefore distinguish between three “typical” but usually 
“‘mixed” strategies of integration, namely a conservative 
(family-based) strategy, a social-democratic (state-based) 
strategy, and a liberal (market-based) strategy. The hypothe-
ses suggested below then allow us to assess the institutional 
effectiveness of these different integration strategies at an 
aggregate level of analysis (countries x years; modelled in 
a pooled regression with fixed effects). That is, technically 
speaking, they do not refer to single countries or specific 
welfare regimes.
At first sight, this “generalized” approach might seem 
counterintuitive. Comparative research on welfare regimes 
usually builds on rather than neutralizes country-specific 
“fixed effects”, including not only permanent geographi-
cal constraints and “deep” cultural persistencies, but also 
institutional inertia and path dependencies. Still, the post-
welfarist transformations to be explored in this paper argu-
ably take place at a global level and thus entail a different 
research design that avoids any sort of “methodological na-
tionalism”. Instead, it has to allow for and, if possible, single 
out supranational factors of convergence (notwithstanding 
remaining divergencies at the national level). Methodologi-
cally, we will thus focus on a “unitary” type of institutional 
change that in principle affects all countries and regimes 
represented in our sample, irrespective of their historical 
particularities and cultural idiosyncrasies, as suggested in 
the third component of our anomie concept.
Whereas the rationale of our research is thus to go beyond 
comparative welfare regime research, we will take account 
of the state-of-the-art in this field in at least two respects. 
On the one hand, we will employ the decommodification 
index, an empirical measure used to classify and distin-
guish different welfare regimes, as a shortcut for the “in-
stitutional balance of power” in a given country (Messner 
and Rosenfeld 1997). In Esping-Andersen’s pioneering work 
(1990), social-democratic, conservative and liberal welfare 
regimes were characterized by their—more or less—distinc-
tive scores at the top, in the middle and at the bottom of a 
simple scale that assesses the generosity and conditionality 
of different social insurance programmes (pensions, unem-
ployment benefit, sick pay). In the context of a macrosociol-
ogy of crime, updated versions of the decommodification 
index may thus serve as a proxy for prevalent institutional 
constellations or integration patterns (Scruggs and Allan 
2006). Nevertheless, this measure is not only contested in its 
discriminatory power regarding different types of welfare 
regimes but also limited in its explanatory power regarding 
“regime-specific” institutional constellations and their role 
in containing anomic crime.
On the other hand, we will therefore replace the decom-
modification index by a range of indicators that spell out 
the institutional effects of the family, the state and the 
labour market for the problem at hand. On a conceptual 
level, we employ the notion of integration strategies in order 
to point to underlying socio-political choices; empirically, 
we will however focus on the factual weight of these institu-
tions and their causal links to anomic crime. Moreover, we 
do not necessarily consider the institutional effectiveness 
of family-based, state-based and market-based integration 
strategies to be contingent on the welfare regime classifica-
tion of the respective countries but will allow for one-sided 
as well as mixed institutional constellations at an aggregate 
level of analysis.
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Figure 1: Theoretical components and expected effects (general)
~
+ –
Development/demography
– economic development
 • GNP per capita
– demographic structure
 • men aged 15–29
Anomic crime/individual delinquency
 • robberies or
 • homicides
Strategies of social integration/
“institutional balance of power”
– (decommodification/regime)
– conservative (“family”) 
 • low female employment
 • low divorce rate
– social democratic (“state”) 
 • high union density
 • high public social expenditure
– liberal (“market”) 
 • low long-term unemployment
 • high imprisonment
Individualized inclusion/exclusion
– economic attainment
 • income inequality
– educational attainment
 • tertiary education
Figure 2: Theoretical components and expected effects (detailed)
+
Dependent variable
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 • homicides
• income inequality
 (alternative measures 
 and sources)
• tertiary education
Independent variables I
• GNP per capita
• men aged 15–29
 (alternatively
 unemployed men
 aged 15–24)
 
Control variables
• (decommodification)
• female employment
• divorce rate
• union density
• public social expenditure
• long-term unemployment
• imprisonment
Independent variables II
–
–
–
–
–
+
+
+
+
+
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The following hypotheses are meant to operationalize the 
first and second component of our anomie concept and 
allow for empirical testing (see Figures 1 and 2). The third 
component is reflected in our methodology and modelling 
strategy.
With respect to the first component of our anomie concept, 
we emphasized the cult of the individual at the cultural level 
and relative deprivation at the structural level. The “inclu-
sive” ethos of individual success thus comes along with the 
“exclusive” experience of individual failure. Two alternative 
considerations lead us to identical hypotheses: On the one 
hand, we can follow Messner (1982) and represent the cul-
tural and structural dimensions of societal transformations 
as “moral individualism” (school enrolment) and “social 
inequality” (income inequality). On the other hand, we can 
highlight the ambiguities that the cult of the individual 
engenders for the school system and the labour market, 
namely strengthened individual competition, increasing 
inequalities and individual failure as the downside of edu-
cational and economic attainment.
Whereas the assumption that income inequality reinforces 
crime is widely held in the literature (see above), it seems 
less obvious to postulate a positive link between school 
enrolment and crime, as we do in this paper. In contrast, 
scholars in the institutional-anomie tradition would rather 
interpret this indicator as a measure of the institutional 
strength of the educational system which helps, in their 
accounts, to counterbalance market forces and thus contain 
anomic crime. Moreover, following Durkheim, there is a 
fine line between “moral” and “excessive” individualism 
which is conceptually important (Thome 2007), but, in the 
case at hand, empirically almost intractable (as one and the 
same indicator might represent both).
Acknowledging these objections, we would like to restate 
our argument that greater emphasis on educational attain-
ment also implies greater emphasis on individual achieve-
ment in education and on the market. The individual’s 
inclusion in society therefore depends less on his/her 
protection by collective associations such as unions and the 
state and more on his/her individual ability to achieve. In 
this situation, there should be greater chances for under-
achievement compared to expectations than in a situation 
of more collectivistic protection of the individual. This 
means relative deprivation, which implies greater propen-
sity to compensate for underachievement using illegitimate 
means, and thus increases delinquency.
Hypothesis 1a: Higher income inequality increases anomic 
crime.
Hypothesis 1b: Higher school enrolment increases anomic 
crime.
With respect to the second component of our anomie 
concept, we distinguish between three strategies of inte-
gration that rely on the institutional effectiveness of the 
family, the state and the labour market respectively and 
thus provide different mechanisms of social support and/
or control that ensure conformity and reduce delinquency. 
The hypotheses below are formulated in the perspective of 
typical proponents of these conservative, social democratic 
and liberal integration strategies; in other words, it is taken 
for granted that institutional effectiveness meets ideological 
expectations. The validity of these claims can then be tested 
empirically.
Conservative integration strategies rely on the integrity and 
integrative capacity of the family, currently challenged by 
trends of family disruption as well as “defamilialization” 
(Esping-Andersen 2000).
Hypothesis 2a: Higher female employment increases anomic 
crime.
Hypothesis 2b: Higher divorce rates increase anomic crime.
Social democratic integration strategies rest on the regula-
tory and redistributory capacity of the state and intermedi-
ate organizations that implement policies of “decommodifi-
cation” (ibid.).
Hypothesis 3a: Higher union density reduces anomic crime.
Hypothesis 3b: Higher public social expenditure reduces 
anomic crime.
Liberal integration strategies mainly build on economic 
incentives and market allocation and thus tend towards 
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“re-commodification” (from welfare to workfare). Besides 
labour market flexibility, we will also consider punitive 
policies as part or complement of these strategies.
Hypothesis 4a: Higher long-term unemployment increases 
anomic crime.
Hypothesis 4b: Higher imprisonment rates reduce anomic 
crime.
The paired hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 that refer to the second 
component of our anomie concept replace the more general 
assumption prominent in institutional-anomie research 
that decommodification is negatively related to crime 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000; cf. Batton 
and Jensen 2002; Jensen 2002). In other words, the degree 
of commodification or decommodification that character-
izes and classifies a welfare regime (e.g. as measured by the 
decommodification index) can be taken as a proxy for the 
institutional balance of power. A “commodified” society 
would thus ceteris paribus produce more anomic crime 
than a “decommodified” society. Although this baseline 
argument conflates the different components unfolded in 
our anomie concept, we will test it as initial hypothesis in 
our modelling strategy (see below).
A final remark has to be made with respect to “anomic” 
crime as the dependent variable in all these hypotheses. 
Cross-national institutional-anomie research has focused so 
far on homicide rates and neglected alternative measures. 
We will instead take robbery rates as the point of reference 
in our model and then compare the results with homicide 
rates. While the former seems preferable for theoretical 
reasons, namely its closer nexus with relative deprivation, 
the latter is often preferred for empirical reasons, namely 
the problem of cross-national data reliability (Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, and Loayza 2002, 8–9; Pratt and Godsey 2003, 
619; Sutton 2004, 180).
5. Data and Methods
The operationalization of broad sociological concepts 
(such as cult of the individual, integration patterns, anomic 
crime) is largely constrained by the availability of appro-
priate data, and this particularly applies to comparative 
research at the cross-national level. Faced with the gap 
between theoretical ambitions and empirical options, our 
approach to data analysis and interpretation goes beyond 
hypothesis-testing in the strict sense and also involves an 
exploratory component. Bearing in mind the ambiguities of 
macrosociological research designs, we are not only inter-
ested in the details of particular findings but also in general 
patterns that emerge from sorting and comparing a large 
number of results. In this respect, our assessment draws on 
the signs and significance but not on the size of indicated 
effects. In the following sections, we will briefly specify the 
data and methods used in our empirical study (for more 
information see Appendix, Table A1).
Dependent variables. We compare two different depend-
ent variables as proxies for the incidence of crime: robbery 
rates and homicide rates. Data for the number of robberies 
per 100,000 people are taken from the UN Survey of Crime 
Trends. Although this survey also gathers data about the 
number of homicides per 100,000 people, we draw our 
homicide data from the WHO, because this source covers 
a larger timespan. As our two dependent variables have 
a rather skewed distribution, we use the robbery rate and 
homicide rate expressed in natural logs, thereby following, 
for example, Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002).
Independent variables. The dependent variables are ex-
pressed as a function of the different variables of our theo-
retical model. To measure income inequality (hypothesis 
1a), we use two alternative indicators: Gini coefficient and 
P90/P10 ratio. For both variables we can draw on OECD 
data. But as the OECD Gini coefficient is only available for 
very few years, we alternatively use data compiled from 
different sources in the World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) provided by the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research of the UN University (UNU-WIDER). 
However, combining data from different sources in a single 
database engenders problems of compatibility. Therefore, 
we use both OECD and WIDER data sets and compare the 
results, whereby we imputed missing values for the OECD 
Gini coefficient. Regarding WIDER Gini coefficient and 
WIDER P90/P10 ratio, we only included data characterized 
as good quality (categories 1 and 2 of the quality rating). 
The OECD P90/P10 ratio is based on data available from 
the OECD Labour Force/Earnings Statistics and comes 
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closest to our ideal measure of “market” income inequal-
ity: unlike income inequality measures based on household 
disposable income, the earnings ratio is directly linked to 
disparities in economic attainment (and, thereby, relative 
deprivation) irrespective of governmental redistribution. 
A “pre-government” inequality indicator also sharpens 
the contrast with integration indicators, most of which are 
“post-government” in fact.
For school enrolment (hypothesis 1b) we use tertiary school 
enrolment rates. We also include the female employment 
rate and the divorce rate (hypotheses 2a and 2b), the union 
density rate and the rate of public social expenditure 
(hypotheses 3a and 3b) as well as the long-term unemploy-
ment rate and the imprisonment rate (hypotheses 4a and 
4b). As incidence of crime and imprisonment rate might be 
co-determined, the imprisonment rate enters our model as 
an endogeneous variable. We thus assume that the crime 
rate (dependent variable) is not only affected by the impris-
onment rate (independent variable) but also conversely the 
imprisonment rate by the crime rate. All other indepen-
dent variables are treated as exogeneous in our model. As 
control variables, we include additionally the share of men 
aged 15–29 (and, alternatively, the share of unemployed men 
aged 15–24) as well as GDP per capita, and furthermore a 
set of time dummy variables (one dummy for each year) to 
control for a possible time trend.
As mentioned for the Gini coefficient above, our variables 
are not available for all the years. Dropping all the cases 
with missing values would considerably reduce the sample 
size. Hence, we imputed missing values using the com-
mand ipolate, which is implemented in Stata. Imputa-
tion of missing values is not unproblematic as the available 
information is used in an inflationary manner. Moreover, 
imputation can obtrude a time trend into the data. This can 
yield biased estimation results. Hence, we tried to constrain 
the imputation to a “reasonable” degree and checked the 
means, minimum, and maximum of our original data with 
the imputed values.
Estimation methods. It has been shown in the literature that 
crime data exhibit inertial properties (Fajnzylber, Leder-
man, and Loayza 2002; Neumayer 2003, 2005). Hence, the 
lagged dependent variable has to be included on the right 
hand side of our estimation model and a dynamic (lag-
dependent) panel approach seems appropriate. 
Consider the following dynamic panel model:
yit = αyi,t-1 + xitβ1 + witβ2 + vi + εit  i = 1,….N        t = 1, ….., T
whereby xit is a vector of strictly exogenous variables (which 
may contain time dummy variables), wit is a vector of 
endogeneous covariates (comprising here only imprison-
ment), β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated, vi 
is the country-specific effect (which can be correlated with 
the covariates), and εit is the idiosyncratic error term. It is 
assumed that the country-specific effects and the error term 
are independent for each country over time.
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable makes 
standard estimators inconsistent as, by construction, the 
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. 
A usual way to deal with this problem is to instrument the 
lagged dependent variable with further lags. Therefore, we 
apply a generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator, 
which was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Accord-
ingly, lagged levels of the dependent variable and of the 
endogenous variables are used as GMM-type instruments. 
Additionally, first differences of the exogenous variables 
are generated to serve as standard instruments. Hence—
through the first differencing—the country-specific effect is 
removed from the equation.
This yields the following equation to be estimated:
yit - yi,t-1  = α(yi,t-1- yi,t-2) + β1’(xit - xi, t-1) + β2’(wi,t-1- wi,t-2)  + (εit - εi,t-1)
In addition to this so-called “Difference GMM” we ap-
ply the “System GMM”. This estimator was developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) extending the work of Arellano 
and Bover (1995). Whereas the “Difference GMM” uses 
lagged levels as instruments in the differenced equation, 
the “System GMM” uses additionally lagged differences as 
instruments for the level equation (for a detailed description 
of the two estimators see also Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza 2002).
204IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 194 – 214Sabine Frerichs et al.: Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies: Cult of the  Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency
Modelling strategy. Regarding our modelling strategy, we 
introduce the explanatory variables in the following order:
In the first step, we only include measures representing the 
first component of our anomie concept, namely income 
inequality (Gini coefficient or P90/P10 ratio) and school en-
rolment, as well as control variables, i.e. GDP per capita and 
men aged 15–29 (or, alternatively, unemployed men aged 
15–24). We assume that these variables are independent of 
each other and restrict our analysis to their main effects; we 
thus do not model interaction effects. As our model builds 
on first differences, multicollinearity concerns proved negli-
gible (see below).
In the second step, we include the decommodification index 
that acts both as a regime indicator (testing the relevance of 
welfare regime classification) and as a rough proxy for the 
second component of our anomie concept. Again, we as-
sumed that this measure is not significantly correlated with 
previous variables.
In the remaining steps, we replace the decommodification 
index by our six explanatory variables that represent con-
servative, social democratic and liberal integration strate-
gies based on the institutions of the family, the state and the 
labour market. Although there might be reason to expect 
significant bivariate correlations between each pair of indi-
cators representing the same strategy, we generally assume 
that the measures are independent of each other and thus 
do not model indices. Taking the first differerences of the 
variables, multicollinearity indeed turned out to be a minor 
problem both within and between the different strategies.
Nevertheless, we introduce the indicators not according 
to the regimes (conservative, social democratic, liberal) or 
institutions (family, state, market) they are derived from but 
according to the idea of a “welfare mix” or “institutional 
balance” of different integration strategies. In the third step, 
we thus only include indicators closely related to labour 
market policies (female employment, union density, long-
term unemployment) and in the fourth step only indica-
tors of a more general socio-political nature (divorce rates, 
public social expenditure, imprisonment). Finally, we test 
the full model encompassing all institutional indicators, 
except for the decommodification index. Again, we rely on 
the main effects of the variables and abstain from model-
ling interaction effects or indices.
6. Results
Before we turn to the results of our multiple regression 
models, we will give some details on bivariate correlations 
computed both for pooled levels and pooled first differences 
(Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002, 10). Regarding 
multivariate statistics, we will focus on regression models 
using robberies as dependent variable since, on the one 
hand, we prefer this measure of anomic crime for theoreti-
cal reasons and, on the other hand, the respective datasets 
proved easier to handle in our modelling procedures.
Bivariate correlations. As mentioned before, our model 
mitigates the problem of multicollinearity by including 
variables only in their first differences (which also entails 
a considerable loss of information). From a methodologi-
cal point of view, we thus have little reason to worry about 
unwanted correlations (Neumayer 2003, 629–30; 2005, 
104–6). With respect to the variables introduced in the first 
two steps of our modelling strategy, there are no significant 
correlations net of fixed effects between any of the follow-
ing variables: income inequality (OECD data) and tertiary 
education, GDP per capita and men aged 15–29 years, and 
decommodification. Only GDP per capita and unemployed 
men aged 15–24 years prove to be significantly correlated 
over time (Table 1).
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Table 1: Selected bivariate correlations I (levels and first differences)
OECD Gini OECD P90/P10
Tertiary  
education
GDP per capita
Men aged  
15–29
Unemployed  
men 15–24
Decommod- 
ification
OECD Gini (a) 1.00 0.62* 0.40* 0.02 0.16* 0.21* -0.75*
(b) 1.00 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.07 -0.04 -0.03
OECD P90/P10 (a) 1.00 0.63* 0.21* 0.20* -0.07 -0.60*
(b) 1.00 -0.06 0.10 -0.05 -0.06 0.10
Tertiary education (a) 1.00 0.38* -0.38* 0.04 -0.21*
(b) 1.00 -0.05 -0.10 0.06 -0.07
GDP per capita (a) 1.00 -0.56* -0.17* 0.22*
(b) 1.00 0.03 -0.59* 0.11
Men aged 15–29 (a) 1.00 -0.16* -0.31*
(b) 1.00 -0.04 -0.04
Unemployed men 15–24 (a) 1.00 -0.20*
(b) 1.00 -0.02
Decommodification (a) 1.00
 (b)       1.00
(a) pooled levels; (b) pooled first differences
Table 2: Selected bivariate correlations II (levels and first differences)
Decommod-
ification
Female  
employment
Union density
Long-term  
unemployment
Divorce
Public social 
expenditure
Incarceration
Decommodification (a) 1.00 0.30* 0.55* 0.22* -0.30* 0.78* -0.60*
(b) 1.00 0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.02 0.03 0.10
Female employment (a) 1.00 0.33* -0.47* 0.52* 0.29* 0.24*
(b) 1.00 -0.14 -0.40* -0.06 -0.32* -0.07
Union density (a) 1.00 0.16* -0.09 0.53* -0.40*
(b) 1.00 -0.07 0.09 0.25* -0.08
Long-term unemployment (a) 1.00 -0.46* 0.45* -0.32*
(b) 1.00 0.03 0.17* 0.05
Divorce (a) 1.00 -0.09 0.57*
(b) 1.00 0.02 0.11*
Public social expenditure (a) 1.00 -0.28*
(b) 1.00 -0.03
Incarceration (a) 1.00
 (b)       1.00
(a) pooled levels; (b) pooled first differences
206IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 194 – 214Sabine Frerichs et al.: Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies: Cult of the  Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency
With respect to the variables introduced in the remaining 
steps of our modelling strategy, notable correlations over 
time only exist between female employment and long-term 
unemployment (-0.40), female employment and public 
social expenditure (-0.32), and public social expenditure and 
union density (0.25). It is especially noteworthy that control-
ling for fixed effects removes any correlation between the 
decommodification index on the one hand and institutional 
indicators on the other hand (Table 2). This is particularly 
striking in the case of our social democratic indicators: 
union density and public social expenditure, the more so as 
the latter is occasionally taken as a proxy for decommodi-
fication and is indeed highly correlated with this measure 
on the basis of pooled levels, i.e. as long as cross-country 
variation is taken into account (0.78).
In addition to multicollinearity issues, we also searched the 
correlation matrix for correlations that might be meaning-
ful for understanding the (assumed) transition to post-
welfarism and thus should be further explored in multiple 
regressions. On the basis of first differences, 25 of 105 
possible correlation values in a matrix of 15 x 15 variables are 
significant at the 5 percent level, four of which have already 
been mentioned above. Regarding our dependent variables, 
robberies are correlated with Gini coefficient (0.15), divorces 
(0.15), men aged 15–29 (0.17) and GDP per capita (-0.14); 
homicides are correlated with P90/P10 ratio (0.18) and 
men aged 15–29 (0.11). Imprisonment—a variable hitherto 
neglected in institutionalist accounts of anomic crime—is 
correlated with divorces (-0.11), unemployed men (0.11) and 
GDP per capita (-0.21). One third of the significant cor-
relations over time thus refers to the triangle of robberies, 
homicides and imprisonment. Three fifths refer to these 
variables and/or control variables.
Multiple regressions. To test our hypotheses and explore the 
patterns of “post-welfarist” change in the timespan covered 
by our data, we ran a large number of regressions both for 
robbery and homicide rates. In the following, we will focus 
on the results obtained for robberies and just briefly refer to 
regressions based on homicides.
With respect to robberies, our model is supported overall 
by the standard tests for GMM estimations, which do not 
produce evidence for model misspecification. The Sargan 
test showed that the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid could not be rejected. The Arellano-
Bond (AB) test showed that the null hypothesis that there 
is no autocorrelation of first order in the first-differenced 
errors could be rejected; this was expected because when 
the idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically 
distributed, the differenced errors are first-order serially 
correlated. At the same time, the null hypothesis that there 
is no autocorrelation of second order in the first-differenced 
errors could not be rejected, and hence there is no evidence 
of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors.
As we tested our model with alternative variables for in-
come inequality (Gini coefficient and P90/P10 ratio, from 
two different sources) and alternative controls for the group 
of young men overrepresented in crime statistics (men aged 
15–29 and unemployed men aged 15–24), there are eight 
versions of the model to be compared, four of which are 
documented in Tables 3 and 4 (for the descriptive statistics 
see Appendix, Table A2). Here, we only vary the inequality 
measures but not the control variables. We decided to be 
more explicit on the former since the results seem to ques-
tion the positive link between income inequality and crime 
that is assumed above, widely described in the literature 
and also corroborated empirically (e.g. Fajnzylber, Leder-
man, and Loayza 2002). Nevertheless, we will also include 
information on the effects of varying the “demographic” 
control variable. Moreover, although more detail will be 
given for estimations with the “Difference GMM”, we will 
also briefly report findings for the “System GMM”.
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Table 3: Robberies: Detailed results for OECD inequality measures
Robberies (natural logs)
OECD Gini coefficient OECD P90/P10 ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5a)
Robberies (lagged) .891*** .888*** .891*** .875*** .847*** .923*** .911*** .906*** .927*** .913*** .933*** .948***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income inequality  
(alternative measures)
 -.002 
 (0.716)
 -.002 
 (0.638)
 -.001 
 (0.911)
 .003 
 (0.533
 .006 
 (0.214)
 -.000 
 (0.935)
 -.098*** 
 (0.000)
-.102*** 
 (0.000)
 -.079*** 
 (0.003)
 -.062** 
 (0.012)
 -.051** 
 (0.047)
 -.098*** 
 (0.008)
Tertiary education .002*** .002*** .002*** .001* .002** .000 .002** .002*** .002*** .001 .002* -.001
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.061) (0.020) (0.814) (0.033) (0.009) (0.007) (0.121) (0.085) (0.688)
Decommodification  .004   .010***  
  (0.270)   (0.003)  
Female employment  .001 .004* -.002 -.000 -.003 -.002
  (0.577) (0.051) (0.150) (0.801) (0.198) (0.367)
Divorce  .026 .021 .061** .059*** .069*** .088***
  (0.238) (0.371) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Union density  .161 .039 .055 .356** .242* .044)
  (0.199) (0.750) (0.614) (0.013) (0.079) (0.724)
Public social expenditure 
 
 -.003 
 (0.226)
 -.001 
 (0.717)
 .001 
 (0.818)
 -.008*** 
 (0.003)
-.008*** 
 (0.004)
-.004 
 (0.489)
Long-term unemployment 
 
 0.000 
(0.999)
 .001 
 (0.272)
 -.000 
 (0.829)
 -.001 
 (0.435)
 -.001 
 (0.368)
 -.002* 
 (0.058)
Imprisonment (lagged) 
 
 -.000*** 
 (0.000)
-.000*** 
 (0.000)
-.000** 
(0.039)
 -.000 
 (0.101)
 -.000 
 (0.313)
 -.000 
 (0.236)
Men aged 15–29 .009*** .010*** .010** .009** .012*** -.002 .008** .008** .007* .010*** .007* -.002
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.003) (0.789) (0.018) (0.016) (0.074) (0.004) (0.061) (0.684)
GDP per capita -.340*** -.374 -.341*** -.340*** -.375*** -.076 -.421*** -.537*** -.369*** -.464*** -.380*** -.185*
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.215) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.059)
Number of observations 401 401 401 401 401 417 390 390 390 390 390 401
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 15
Sargan test (Pr > chi2 =) 0.575 0.601 0.587 1.000 1.000  0.174 0.266 0.311 1.000 1.000
AB test order 1 (Pr > z =) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test order 2 (Pr > z =) 0.401 0.376 0.409 0.348 0.374  0.188 0.199 0.196 0.107 0.099
* Significant at p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; standard error in parentheses; (1) - (5) Difference GMM; (5a) System GMM
Note: For the OECD Gini coefficient Belgium, Korea, Spain, and Switzerland are not included; for the OECD P90/P10 ratio Austria, Finland, Korea, Norway, and Spain are not included.
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Table 4: Robberies: Detailed results for WIDER inequality measures
 Robberies (natural logs)
WIDER Gini coefficient WIDER P90/P10 ratio
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (5a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5a)
Robberies (lagged) .907*** .904*** .927*** .909*** .921*** .931*** .915*** .912*** .934*** .909*** .914*** .933***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income inequality  
(alternative measures)
 .005** 
 (0.013
 .004** 
 (0.016)
 .005*** 
 (0.006)
.004** 
 (0.018)
 .004** 
 (0.015)
 .007** 
 (0.024)
 -.012** 
 (0.015)
 -.012** 
(0.015)
 -.013** 
 (0.017)
 -.007 
 (0.140)
 -.009* 
 (0.088)
 -.005 
 (0.389)
Tertiary education .002*** .003*** .002*** .001* .001 -.000 .003*** .003*** .003*** .002** .002** .001
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.067) (0.126) (0.936) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.036) (0.680)
Decommodification  .007**   .005  
  (0.033)   (0.148)  
Female employment  .001 .000 -.001 -.001 -.000 -.000
  (0.744) (0.816) (0.683) (0.622) (0.805) (0.809)
Divorce  .063*** .070*** .064*** .041** .047** .066***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.043) (0.028) (0.002)
Union density  .381*** .180 .239* .234 .004 .089
  (0.002) (0.136) (0.071) (0.153) (0.981) (0.418)
Public social expenditure 
 
 -.007** 
 (0.010)
 -.006** 
 (0.021)
 -.003 
 (0.514)
- .007*** 
 (0.007)
 -.006** 
(0.030)
 -.004 
 (0.383)
Long-term unemployment 
 
 -.001 
 (0.470)
 -.000 
 (0.448)
 -.001 
 (0.450)
 -.001* 
 (0.054)
 -.001 
 (0.208)
 -.001 
 (0.181)
Imprisonment (lagged) 
 
 -.000*** 
 (0.006)
-.000** 
 (0.048)
 -.000*** 
 (0.004)
 -.000** 
 (0.032)
 -.000* 
 (0.080)
 -.000** 
 (0.021)
Men aged 15–29 .008** .008** .007* .008** .008** -.000 .003 .004 .002 .006* .007* -.002
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.086) (0.010) (0.022) (0.970) (0.365) (0.325) (0.545) (0.058) (0.072) (0.749)
GDP per capita -.208** -.284*** -.179 -.290*** -.283*** -.101* -.400*** -.455*** -.428*** -.460*** -.483*** -.289**
 (0.032) (0.006) (0.107) (0.004) (0.008) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019)
Number of observations 447 447 447 447 447 461 403 403 403 403 403 415
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 16 16 16 16
Sargan test (Pr > chi2 =) 0.001 0.002 0.007 1.000 1.000  0.263 0.310 0.441 1.000 1.000
AB test order 1 (Pr > z =) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AB test order 2 (Pr > z =) 0.496 0.446 0.483 0.346 0.328  0.544 0.508 0.527 0.434 0.425  
* Significant at p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; standard error in parentheses; (1) – (5) Difference GMM; (5a) System GMM
Note: For the WIDER Gini coefficient Korea and Spain are not included; for the WIDER P90/P10 ratio Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and Spain are not included.
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Starting with the models for robberies that apply the “Dif-
ference GMM” and include the Gini coefficient as income 
inequality measure (either from OECD or WIDER data-
bases) and men aged 15–29 as demographic control varable, 
we obtain significant results in line with expectations for 
the lagged dependent variable and both control variables. 
Of the two variables representing the first component of our 
anomie concept, one, namely tertiary education, is signifi-
cant with the “right” sign in all model variants and model-
ling steps; the other, the Gini coefficient, yields significant 
positive results only when WIDER data is used. The decom-
modification index, introduced in the second modelling 
step, is generally positively signed in all model variants but 
reaches significance only in models using the WIDER Gini 
coefficient. According to that, the link between decom-
modification and robberies over time is not negative but 
positive. When we replace, in the third modelling step, 
the decommodification index by indicators that repre-
sent besides different integration strategies also different 
labour market policies (female employment, union den-
sity, long-term unemployment), only union density comes 
close to (see OECD Gini coefficient; Table 3) or reaches (see 
WIDER Gini coefficient; Table 4) significance, albeit with 
the “wrong” sign: The institutional effectiveness of “decom-
modifying” social democratic labour market policies with 
respect to integration and crime prevention is thus once 
more called into question. In the fourth modelling step, the 
three other, more general indicators of conservative, social 
democratic and liberal integration strategies (divorce rates, 
public social expenditure, imprisonment) are included 
instead and indeed perform quite well and according to 
assumptions. Although only one of them (imprisonment) 
reaches significance in the model variant with OECD Gini 
coefficient, all of them are significant when the WIDER 
Gini coefficient is used. Apart from labour market policies, 
the institutional effectiveness of the different integration 
strategies thus seems less questionable. The fifth modelling 
step—the full model including all institutional variables 
(except for the decommodification index)—largely confirms 
the aforementioned effects in the WIDER version, whereas 
results are, once more, less conclusive in the OECD version 
(where curiously female employment is now significant with 
the hypothesized sign).
In alternative regressions including unemployed men aged 
15–24 (instead of men aged 15–29), the control variables do 
not always reach significance and perform somewhat dif-
ferently when model variants based on OECD and WIDER 
Gini coefficients are compared. Apart from that, the results 
obtained for the explanatory variables in the aformentioned 
model specifications are largely replicated even when the 
demographic control variable is changed.
Turning to models for robberies that still employ the 
“Difference GMM” but now include the P90/P10 ratio 
as measure of “market” income inequality (again drawn 
from OECD as well as WIDER sources), the most strik-
ing finding is that, other than expected, a more balanced 
earnings distribution does not reduce but rather increase 
the incidence of crime. By changing the indicator, the 
causal link between income inequality and anomic crime 
thus seems to be reversed. Whereas in these models the 
demographic control variable is not always significant, the 
rest of the results generally confirm what has been stated 
above. The decommodification index (second modelling 
step) and the employment-related institutional indicators 
(third modelling step) do not corroborate the hypotheses 
underlying the different integration strategies. Instead, we 
once again find inconclusive as well as contradictory results, 
i.e. several variables (namely, the decommodification index, 
union density and long-term unemployment) are significant 
at least in some of the specifications but with the “wrong” 
sign. At the same time, the three other institutional indica-
tors (fourth modelling step) yield results that are almost 
always significant and in line with expectations. Again, the 
findings for model variants including either men aged 15–29 
or unemployed men aged 15–24 are structurally similar.
Comparing the results of “Difference GMM” estimations 
with “System GMM” estimations raises doubts about some 
of these findings but does not question the overall approach 
in interpreting the data. Referring only to the full model 
(fifth modelling step), it is clear that estimations based on 
the “System GMM” yield less significant results. Still, the 
lagged dependent variable, the divorce rate, the imprison-
ment rate and the control for GDP per capita are signifi-
cant with the expected signs in all model specifications (or 
all but one). Regarding income inequality, there are both 
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significant positive results (WIDER Gini coefficient) and 
significant negative results (OECD P90/P10 ratio) as well 
as some inconclusive ones. As before, union density and 
long-term unemployment occasionally turn significant with 
the “wrong” signs. In contrast, this time tertiary education 
does not reach significance in the full model (but in earlier 
modelling steps) nor does public social expenditure (in any 
of the modelling steps). The latter finding has to be taken 
into account when assessing the institutional effectiveness 
of the social democratic integration strategy.
With respect to homicides, our model is supported by the 
Sargan test, but not by the second Arellano-Bond test, 
according to which there is evidence for serial correlation 
in the first-differenced errors at order two. As this means 
that the moment conditions used are not valid and that 
the model seems to be misspecified, we will not go into 
the details of these regressions. But if the prelimary results 
are of any use to the problem at hand, they challenge the 
assumption that the two crime indicators considered in 
this paper can be used interchangeably. As a matter of fact, 
robberies and homicides are substantially correlated only 
when cross-sectional variation is taken into account (0.44) 
whereas there is no significant correlation over time (0.10). 
This discrepancy seems to be reflected in quantitative and 
qualitative differences in the effects of at least some of the 
explanatory variables (e.g. the decommodification index 
and the imprisonment rate) when compared to the above 
findings. Still, all in all the results (as yet not reliable) hint 
at the same problems of employment-related integration 
strategies that were pointed out in the previous analysis.
7. Conclusions
The aim of this study was to map patterns of integration in 
societies at the transition from welfarism to post-welfarism. 
For this purpose, we built on theoretical and empirical 
approaches within the anomie paradigm that interlinks 
general and criminal sociology. In multiple regressions for a 
sample of twenty developed countries in the period 1970–
2004, we focused on the robbery rate as indicator of the 
institutional effectiveness of different integration strategies 
(namely, conservative, social democratic and liberal).
Overall, our research design proved successful as we were 
able to demonstrate that individual inclusion and strati-
fied exclusion on the one hand and different strategies of 
integration (represented by our institutional indicators) 
on the other hand interlink in regulating the incidence of 
crime. Furthermore, we had good reason not to conflate the 
effects of indicators representing different dimensions of the 
same strategy in indices but to group the indicators across 
strategies instead (see modelling steps three and four). That 
way, we were able to single out the problematic—and indeed 
somewhat counterintuitive—effects of employment-related 
policies (here interpreted as means of social integration) 
over time. We thus found evidence that familialist (low fe-
male employment), unionist (high union density) and liber-
alist (low long-term unemployment) employment strategies 
do not necessarily lower but occasionally increase anomic 
crime. At the same time, the “family” (low divorces), the 
“state” (high public social expenditure) and the “prison” 
(high imprisonment)—the latter interpreted as institutional 
counterpart of the “market”—do effectively contribute to 
crime prevention and social integration when other aspects 
of the respective strategies are taken into account.
The rather positive than negative effect of the decommodi-
fication index indicates that welfare regime classification 
matters, albeit not in the expected sense. The significant 
results obtained at least in some of our models would thus 
suggest that “commodification” and not “decommodifica-
tion” induces lower crime levels over time in a given society. 
While the results summarized so far seem more or less co-
herent, a puzzle is left by the contradictory performance of 
the Gini coefficient (positive sign when using OECD data) 
and the P90/P10 ratio (negative sign both for OECD and 
WIDER data) as alternative measures of income inequality. 
To be sure, the former rather relates to a “pre-government” 
and the latter to a “post-government” income distribution. 
Still, we rather would have expected the opposite effects. To 
make sense of the results, we thus have to re-interpret the 
Gini coefficient as a measure of “decommodified” income 
distribution and the P90/P10 ratio as a measure of “com-
modified” income distribution. Through this lens, the 
“curious” results just replicate the findings for the decom-
modification index.
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As the latter example shows, the link between theoretical 
assumptions and empirical operationalization—and there-
fore the interpretation of the findings—remains contingent 
and rather contentious in macrosociological studies like 
ours. Still, the exploration and assessment of a large number 
of empirical results yields important insights for under-
standing and theorizing upon contemporary societies. But 
to substantiate our assumption that there is a general shift 
towards more “liberal” regimes that build on incentive as 
well as punitive elements, further analyses will be neces-
sary that also scrutinize the possible “artifacts” of different 
estimation methods and sample structures.
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Appendix
Table A1: Data description and sources
Variable Description Source
Robberies Total recorded robberies, per 100,000 population UN Surveys of Crime Trends
Homicides
Homicide and manslaughter, estimated total deaths per  
100,000 population
WHO
OECD Gini coefficient Gini coefficient for the distribution of household disposable income OECD, Society at a Glance 2005
OECD p90p10 ratio
Ratio of earnings at the 90th percentile level to earnings at the 10th 
percentile level
OECD Labour Force/Earnings Statistics
WIDER Gini index See definitions in WIID UNU-WIDER database
WIDER p90p10 ratio See definitions in WIID UNU-WIDER database 
Tertiary education School enrolment, tertiary (in % gross) WDI 1999 and 2007
Female employment Share of women of working age (15 to 64 years) in employment OECD Factbook 2007
Divorce Crude divorce rate, number of divorces per 100,000 population
OECD, Society at a Glance 2006; for Canada: 
Statistics Canada; for Australia: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics
Union density
Union members divided by total employees, both from survey data; if no 
survey data available for union members administrative data were used
OECD Statistics
Public social expenditure Public social expenditure as percentage of GDP OECD, Society at a Glance 2005
Long-term unemployment 
Persons unemployed for 12 months or more as a percentage of total 
unemployed
OECD Factbook 2007
Imprisonment Prisoners per 100,000 people OECD, Society at a Glance 2001 and 2006
Men aged 15–29
Male population aged between 15 and 29 years as a share of the total 
population
OECD Statistics
Unemployed men aged 15–24 Unemployment rate of young men aged between 15 and 24 OECD Statistics
GDP per capita GDP per capita, purchasing power parity, constant US $ WDI 2007
Decommodification index
Index based on welfare state characteristics (pensions, unemployment, 
sick leave)
Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 
(provided by Lyle Scruggs; see www.sp.uconn.
edu/~scruggs/wp.htm)
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Table A2: Descriptive characteristics of the sample
Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Robberies 62.04 51.89 1.29 272.69
OECD Gini coefficient 27.51 4.21 17.70 36.14
Tertiary education 43.40 17.88 15.28 97.70
Female employment 55.60 11.76 27.20 81.00
Divorce rate 2.28 0.99 0.20 5.30
Union density 0.43 0.20 0.10 0.84
Public social expenditure 20.93 6.35 3.50 36.80
Long-term unemployment 27.95 17.58 1.10 78.50
Imprisonment 99.10 106.12 22.00 711.67
Men aged 15–29 33.91 4.07 24.36 45.18
GDP per capita 20118.57 6101.77 9955.07 38200.41
Decommodification index 26.80 5.96 14.90 43.10
OECD P90/P10 ratio 2.99 0.82 1.02 5.78
WIDER Gini coefficient 30.08 4.94 19.80 42.10
WIDER P90/P10 ratio 5.65 1.95 1.83 12.64
Note: As the descriptive statistics for the different models are largely redundant, we provide only the details for the model based on the OECD Gini coefficent and add rows for the alternative 
inequality measures we used (OECD P90/P10 ratio, WIDER Gini coefficient, WIDER P90/P10 ratio), which slightly changed the overall sample.
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